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Russian industrial enterprises inherited from the Soviet era a tradition of producing welfare 
and infrastructure services within the firm, also for outside users. Despite the massive re-
structuring of the economy that took place since, many firms are still active in service pro-
vision. At the same time, opaque fiscal federalism is a problem for municipalities whereas 
rent extraction by public sector officials is a problem for firms. In this paper we examine 
whether there is a link between these phenomena. We propose a model on local fiscal in-
centives, service provision by firms and the municipality-firm relationship in the form of 
bribes. Using survey data from 404 medium and large industrial enterprises in 40 regions 
of Russia, we find that the higher the share of own revenues in the local budget, the more 
likely the firms are to report bribes. In the case of infrastructure services, the data also sup-
port the hypothesis that the channel is through service provision: the less fiscal autonomy, 
the more service provision and the less likely the firms are to report bribes. 
 
 
JEL codes: H77, M14, P31 
Keywords: Local fiscal incentives, corruption, service provision, Russia, firm survey 
                                                 
1 The work reported here is part of the project “Infrastructure and Welfare Services in Russia: Enterprises as 
Beneficiaries and Service Providers” financed by the Academy of Finland (project number 200936), the 
World Bank, and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. The project has also received support from the Bank of 
Finland Institute for Economies in Transition and worked in close co-operation with the Centre for Economic 
and Financial Research Moscow. Previous versions of the paper were presented at: the FDPE seminar; the 
BOFIT-CEFIR workshop; BOFIT and HECER seminars; the XXVIII Annual Meeting of the Finnish Society 
for Economic Research, Helsinki, February 2006; the Higher School of Economics annual international con-
ference in Moscow, April 2006; the EACES-CRIISEA workshop in Amiens, June 2006; and the EACES 9
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bi-annual conference in Brighton, September 2006. We thank Pekka Ilmakunnas and Greetje Everaert for 
fruitful discussion and have also benefited from helpful comments and suggestions by Iikka Korhonen, Olga 
Lazareva, Jukka Pirttilä and William Pyle. Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
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Venäläiset teollisuusyritykset perivät neuvostoajoilta keskeisen roolin paikallisten sosiaali- 
ja infrastruktuuripalveluiden tuottajina. Huolimatta 1990-luvun alussa alkaneesta yhteis-
kunnan ja talouden rakennemuutoksesta monet yritykset tuottavat yhä itse palveluita tai 
tukevat paikallisia palveluita muulla keinoin. Samaan aikaan federaatio-, alue- ja kunta-
tasojen välinen vallan-, vastuun- ja rahanjako on ollut epäselvä ja toisaalta yrityksiltä on 
vaadittu epävirallisia maksuja julkisen sektorin palveluiden saamiseksi. Tässä tutkimuk-
sessa kehitetään yksinkertainen teoreettinen malli yllä mainittujen ilmiöiden mahdollisista 
yhteyksistä ja testataan mallin tulokset 404 keskisuuresta ja suuresta yrityksestä 40:llä 
Venäjän alueella kerätyllä aineistolla. Mallin mukaan yritykset ja kunta voivat liittoutua 
ylempiä hallintotasoja vastaan. Yritys saa anteeksi veroja, jos se osallistuu palveluiden tuo-
tantoon, ja toisaalta sen pitäisi joutua silloin maksamaan vähemmän lahjuksia. Tulokset 
osoittavat, että mitä itsenäisempi kunta on taloudellisesti, sitä vähemmän yritykset osallis-
tuvat paikallisen infrastruktuurin ylläpitoon ja toisaalta sitä todennäköisemmin ne rapor-
toivat joutuneensa maksamaan lahjuksia. Asumispalveluiden tuotannossa vastaavaa 
yhteyttä ei löydy. 
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1  Introduction 
 
 
Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a production structure in which industrial enter-
prises played a major role in providing goods and services such as housing and medical 
care. The result was a system that Ericson (1999) calls Industrial Feudalism, where federal 
authority is quite weak relative to regional and municipal authorities and where people are 
tied to the local economy through the provision of public services. 
These same firms are still extensively participating in the provision of local ser-
vices, typically provided by the public sector or specialised private enterprises in a market 
economy. This is clearly shown in the data collected in a unique survey of 404 medium-
sized and large Russian industrial firms, as the firms continue to own social assets and fi-
nance the public social sphere and infrastructure.
2  
The services produced by firms are not limited to social ones but include parts of 
infrastructure like electricity and heating as well. In some extreme cases, for example, heat 
production might be the only profitable activity within an enterprise that originally concen-
trated in a completely different line of business. Furthermore, firms may directly contribute 
to the local community by financing municipal social assets, local road or rail building, the 
renovation of water supply and sewage systems and so on, anticipating tax or other favours 
from the municipal government, which is in turn often willing to engage in these barter 
transactions in order to avoid losing tax revenue to upper levels of government.
3 It may be 
argued that engaging in these activities diverts firms’ resources from more productive uses, 
thus impeding growth.  
In this paper we present a simple model for local service provision to derive hy-
potheses on whether increased local fiscal autonomy is good or bad for the Russian firms, 
and test our hypotheses using these newly available survey data. In previous literature it 
has been pointed out that in order for decentralization to be really effective, structures of 
local accountability have to be in place first (see e.g. Bardhan 2005). Otherwise, ambigu-
ous resource allocation between different layers of government may result in perverse fis-
cal incentives at the local level. We show that local government officials are not necessar-
ily helpless in the face of predation by upper levels of government, as has been suggested 
                                                 
2 The survey and basic data description is available in Haaparanta-Juurikkala-Lazareva-Pirttilä-Solanko-
Zhuravskaya (2003).   
3 The Russian Federation government is three-tiered, with federal, regional and municipal layers. Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




in previous literature, but rather collude with local firms to get around the challenge. Firms 
participate by offering local services. This practice may then also have the positive effect 
that fewer bribes are demanded from the private sector locally. 
Service provision by firms may also be seen as a mere legacy from the Soviet era, 
or as a regular economic decision to compensate workers with a package of wages and 
fringe benefits, just as in any country.
4 In addition to these approaches, the general discus-
sion on corporate social responsibility in Russia and elsewhere attempts to shed light on 
the issues of local participation by firms. In this paper we, however, concentrate particu-
larly on the firm- local public sector interaction and hypotheses related to fiscal incentives 
of the municipality. 
The system of regional autonomy with formal, local non-autonomy can in general 
be seen as a major source of problems in the Russian economy. Shleifer and Treisman 
(2000) argue that this system has supplied all the sub-national authorities with incentives to 
engage in rent extraction. Given that shared taxes are a major source of revenue, the prob-
lem of the commons arises where resources are devoted to fight for the revenue and to di-
vert revenue for own use and away from everybody else. At the local and regional levels, it 
is understood that if they locally get only a share of the tax revenue collected, then it is 
beneficial to divert the revenue from higher-level authorities. With large powers devoted to 
the regional authorities, this has certainly been feasible. 
This system also has implications for the relationships between firms and authori-
ties. As noted above, one way to divert tax revenue is to extort payments from the firms 
indirectly by means of charging various extra fees and directly by blackmailing. This prac-
tice naturally shrinks the tax base, but may be viewed as the optimal solution by sub-
national authorities. However, this system does not offer an efficient means of collecting 
revenue and certainly has implications for the regional and local provision of public ser-
vices. In this system, authorities are biased towards subsidizing firms that are seen as a 
source of rents, while they are biased against protecting firms from corruption (Gehlbach 
2003)
5. 
These problems are aggravated by the lack of local autonomy, which increases in-
centives for local authorities to use firms as a source of revenue, especially when expendi-
                                                 
4 See Friebel and Guriev (2005), and Grosfeld et al (2001). In two companion papers to this one, using the 
same data, Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006a and 2006b) find that giving up company housing has in many 
cases involved a lengthy negotiation process with the local public sector, and that current social service pro-
vision by the firms indeed reduces their labour turnover. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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tures dictated by federal authorities cannot be met. This situation also reduces incentives to 
efficiently provide public services (Litwack 2003). An additional source of inefficiency 
arises when local revenues are independent of local policies. This happens if municipali-
ties’ income comes from sources such as tax sharing and as transfers from higher-level 
governments
6. In this case, local authorities do not have any incentive to efficiently pro-
duce public services. Zhuravskaya (2000) provides evidence for this mechanism. Her re-
sults have been partly challenged by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003), who argue that 
the marginal tax rates for own revenue are below 100% and that the source of inefficiency 
is the inability of regional authorities to commit to efficient incentive contracts. But the 
main point of under-provision of local public goods remains. 
The mechanisms described above do not, however, allow for the possibility of di-
verting taxes at the local level. Empirically, this is a significant phenomenon (Kurly-
andskaya 2002, Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland 2001, and Sonin 2003). One possible 
route for diversion is to make local enterprises provide public services in exchange for re-
duced taxes or increased tax arrears
7. 
We analyse the reasons behind these persisting phenomena by focusing on the con-
nection of the ambiguous distribution of tax revenues between various layers of govern-
ment, and possible excessive local regulation and bribery. We model why, in the current 
situation, it may be optimal at the local level to provide services through industrial firms. 
We take the regional and federal level action as given and concentrate on the relations be-
tween the municipal and upper levels of government from the local point of view, as well 
as on those between the municipality and firms. 
Our model is based on Zhuravskaya (2000). It implies that if the main motive for 
providing (in principle) publicly provided services through firms is to increase the munici-
pality's share in overall tax revenues, then one should observe that the firms are more likely 
to bribe, if the level of local fiscal autonomy is high. This result is in contrast to the result 
in Zhuravskaya. The intuition is that with less budgetary independence, municipalities 
have an interest in colluding with the firms in such a way that they produce services and in 
exchange are forgiven part of their taxes. Thus, municipalities have less incentive to extort 
bribes. We did indeed find evidence in the survey data that the higher the share of own 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Timofeev (2002) argues also that local authorities are more sensitive to local “pressures”, increasing the 
problem in regions with a higher degree of sub-regional decentralization. 
6 Transfers to a municipality decline when its revenues increase. 
7 See also Tonis (2003). Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




revenues in the local budget, the more likely the firms are to report bribes, and that firms 
engaged in heating or housing provision do receive special treatment from the public sec-
tor. 
Next, in sections 2 and 3 we present the model and evidence from the survey data. 
Section 4 concludes and sets an agenda for future work. 
 
 
2  The model 
 
Our model attempts to highlight the crucial role of service provision by firms in shaping 
the relationship between firms and local authorities. Our point is that service provision can 
be a means for the local authorities to fight for a higher share of tax revenue under condi-
tions where the distribution of tax revenue is not clearly defined. 
Assume there are several layers of government with municipalities at the lowest 
level. Assume further that the total taxes being collected are T, of which the (representa-
tive) municipality receives share 0 <θ  <1. The tax revenue is thus a common pool that the 
various authorities try to capture (Shleifer and Treisman 2000, Zhuravskaya 2000). As-














Here  i P  = the amount of the public good i produced and  i c  = the unit cost of pro-
ducing it in the public sector. 
Assume now that the municipality has the option of affecting the tax collection. To 
make our point clear we assume that the municipality can decide how much a firm has to 
pay in taxes to give it incentives to supply a public good. Let that be good 1. In this case 
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Here  1 p c  = the unit cost of producing public good 1 by the private firm and s = the 
taxes the firm can avoid paying. Thus, the firm has an interest in the tax revenue-hiding 
scheme itself. Implicit in the formulation (2) is the assumption that the municipality can 
perfectly control the production of the public good. Finally, it is also assumed that the firm 
cannot hide any of its revenue from the local officials. Given that the municipality benefits 
from the scheme when these assumptions are made, it certainly would benefit even if the 
firm were able to shirk on a small part of the public good production requirement. 
Comparing (1) and (2), it is clear that a) the tax rebate to the firm increases the total 
tax revenue that the municipality can obtain, assuming the firm supplies the good; b) the 
public good provision can be biased towards the production of good 1; and c) the tax rebate 
can be optimal for the municipality even if the firm’s unit cost of producing the public 
good is higher than the municipality’s unit cost. 
To get a more concrete impression of how these ideas may be applied and to under-
stand what role the service provision by firms can play, we take a special case of the model 
outlined above. This extends Zhuravskaya’s (2000) model to a situation in which the firm 
might also produce a public good, or in our case, to be exact, a private good or service, 
which would, however, typically be provided by the public sector or by specialised as op-
posed to industrial firms. The feature outlined above, the sharing of tax revenues, already 
incorporates Zhuravskaya. The point we make is that the provision of local services by the 
firms may reverse Zhuravskaya’s conclusion that tax revenue sharing results in excessive 
regulation or harassment of firms at the expense of public good provision. 
As in Zhuravskaya (2000), public revenues T consist of the sum of shared and own 
revenues. In our case, we next restrict ourselves to a situation where the municipality pro-
duces only good 2. By assumption, own revenues consist of a fixed part W and a variable 
part  ) , , ( 2 1 B P P W , where B  is a private benefit to the mayor from excessive business regu-
lation or bribes. Own revenue is an increasing function of the local tax base. Public goods 
provision reduces the general costs of doing business, thus increasing local economic ac-
tivity and having a positive effect on the tax base. Over-regulation, or demanding bribes, 
has the opposite effect. In addition, we assume that public goods provision cannot increase 
revenue net of the costs of providing them: 0< 1 P W <1, 0< 2 P W <1 and  B W <0.  
We also assume that the shared revenues depend on the municipality's own reve-
nues, consisting of a fixed part T and a variable part  [] s B P P W − ) , , ( 2 1 α  where the exoge-Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




nous parameter α,  0 1 ≤ ≤ − α , represents the mayor’s ability to raise revenues at the mar-
gin. α measures the degree by which the city can affect its revenues through its own meas-
ures. Zhuravskaya (2000) estimates α to be close to –1 while Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya 
(2002) estimate a smaller (in absolute value) figure. The idea here is that higher-level au-
thorities can affect the transfers to the region. In general, they reduce transfers if revenues 
at the local level increase. This provides perverse incentives at the local level. We thus de-
fine  α θ + ≡1 . We also set, for simplicity only, both the public and private sector unit costs 
of production to unity. With the more natural assumption that private sector production 
costs are lower, there would be an additional motive for shifting production to the private 
sector. We want to focus only on the tax revenue-shifting motive. The optimisation prob-






s B P P W T W P
t s
B P P u s B P P
≤
− + + ≤
1
2 1 2








Setting  1 P s = , we can express the budget constraints as  () [] B P P W T W P P , , 2 1 2 1 θ θ + + ≤ +   
Constructing the Lagrangian for solving the optimisation problem above gives us 
() () [ ] 2 1 2 1 2 1 , , , , P P B P P W T W B P P u L − − + + + = θ θ λ  from where it may already be seen that 
when the mayor’s ability to raise revenues worsens, or θ  decreases, the relative price of 
producing  1 P  becomes lower. Now  B P P , , 2 1  (and s since  1 P is set equal to s at the optimum) 
are defined by equations (i) – (iv): 
 
 (i)  0 1 1 = + − p p W u λθ λθ  
 (ii)  0 2 2 = + − p p W u λθ λ  
 (iii)  0 = + B B W u λθ  
 (iv)  () [] B P P W T W P P , , 2 1 2 1 θ θ + + = +  
 
These conditions clearly show that public good provision is biased towards the pro-
vision of good 1. In the extreme case where θ = 0, i.e. local revenues are not at all affected 
by local policies, local authorities clearly have an incentive to harass local firms for the 
authorities' own benefit (by (3iii)). But contrary to the case analysed in Zhuravskaya, the 
incentives to provide  1 P  are also strengthened, since now it can be used to increase local BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




8. Hence, it is not at all clear how the shared tax problem affects the extent of har-
assment relative to public good provision. 
To get a clearer picture we consider a special case where  1 P  and  2 P  are perfect sub-
stitutes or in practice they are the same good, which either the public or the private sector, 
or both, can produce. This describes a situation in which really the issue is how much of 
the (public) good is to be provided within the public sector and how much by firms. The 




() [] B P P W T W P P
t s




2 1 2 1
2 1 , , , 2 1





from which one can conclude that the public sector will not produce the good at all, 
given the possibility to make the private sector produce it through the tax rebate incentive, 
and the fact that the mayor is not able to keep all locally raised tax revenue within the mu-
nicipality budget. 
 
Proposition 1:  2 P =0 when  1 P  and  2 P  are perfect substitutes and θ <1 
Proof of proposition 1: 
Straightforward ∴ 
 
Clearly, with the assumptions made, it is cheaper for the authorities to make firms produce 
all of a (public) good: one unit of the good 1 produced by the firm costs only θ < 1 = cost 
of providing one unit by the local government. Thus, it is optimal to make firms provide all 
of it. 




() [] B P W T W P
t s






θ θ + + =
  (5) 
 
                                                 
8 Note that in Zhuravskaya’s case (where s = 0) the relative supplies of both public goods are at their first 
best levels but their provision is suboptimal. The first best case for the given transfer policies adopted by 
higher-level authorities can be obtained by maximizing the utility with B = 0 and subject to the budget con-
straint  () [] B P P W T W P P , , 2 1 2 1 θ + + ≤ + . Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




We also assume that  () B P W , 1  is concave, 0< 1 P W <1 and  B W <0 as above, and that  1 1P P W <0,  
B B W <0 and  B P W 1 <0. Furthermore, we assume, according to Zhuravskaya (2000), that the 
utility function is of form  bB P u + = 1 . The parameter b measures the degree to which the 
mayor is corrupt. From (5) it then follows that the less able the mayor is to keep the local 
tax revenues within the local budget, the more the private sector produces good  1 P  and the 
less incentive there is for the mayor to extract private benefits through bribes or other 
means. 
 




 Proposition  3: 
θ d
dP 1 <0 
 
The proofs of these propositions are in Appendix. 
 
By combining these two propositions, we reach a striking conclusion: The less local 
authorities can control the revenues they have access to, the less they will harass local 
firms for their own private benefit if they have an opportunity to use local firms to provide 
the (public) good. This is exactly the opposite of the main conclusion in Zhuravskaya 
(2000). The intuition is that the opportunity to switch tax revenue to local authorities 
through firms’ provision of public services increases the cost of harassment relative to the 
case when the option is not available. 
In the empirical work, we do not have data directly on θ. Proposition 2 implies that 
if the main motive for providing (public) services through firms is to increase the share of 
the local community in shared tax revenues, then one should observe a negative correlation 
between the bribes paid to local authorities and the extent of service provision by local 
firms. Proposition 3 implies that if θ varies across municipalities one should also expect the 
relative provision of public services by firms to vary across them if the ease with which 
firms can provide various services varies across municipalities. If e.g. a firm did not divest 
its housing stock or stop providing heat to users outside the firm early on in the transition, 
one may expect the municipality to not be willing to allow it to do it later. Hence, one 
would see differences in the divestment of the housing stock or heat production as reflect-
ing variation in θ across municipalities. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Next we discuss evidence from firm survey data. We concentrate on housing and 
heating as they have been by far the major social and infrastructure assets or services the 
firms provide. Also, our theory does not require that all services be used to divert tax reve-
nues to the local authorities. Hence, we are trying to find if there is any evidence for the 
diversion mechanism outlined above. Also, we are concerned with whether the mechanism 
is significant enough. By focusing on the most important services provided by the firms, 
we can achieve both goals. We provide first an overview of which firms provided housing 
and/or heating in 2003 
9, and, separately, which firms were likely to report positive bribes. 
Second, we combine these results to see whether and how service provision and, simulta-
neously, the probability that the firms report positive bribes, are determined by the level of 
local fiscal autonomy in their respective municipality. 
 
3  Evidence 
 
3.1  The data 
10  
 
The results are based on a survey of 404 middle-sized and large manufacturing firms in 40 
Russian regions conducted in 2003. In the survey we examined the extent of social service 
and infrastructure provision by the firms and the firms’ assessment of the quality of public 
infrastructure and the regulatory environment. Background information including owner-
ship, investment, performance, competition, and finance decisions of the firms was also 
gathered. 
The source of information for the population of firms is the enterprise registry 
maintained by Rosstat (Federal State Statistics Service). In the construction of our sample 
we concentrated on the industrial sector, and within it manufacturing firms for which en-
ergy production is not a regular line of business. We set a minimum size limit of 400 em-
ployees, as pilot interview rounds indicated that smaller firms are unlikely to provide infra-
structure or social services. Constructed in such a way, our sample frame contained 3523 
firms. Our sampling technique includes a combination of clustering by region and system-
atic sampling by size. In the 404 firms in our final sample, the general manager and the 
managers responsible for social and infrastructure affairs were interviewed face-to-face. 
Accounting information was left to be filled in by the chief accountant. 
                                                 
9 These issues are discussed in more depth in two companion papers, Juurikkala (2006) and Solanko (2006). 
10 For more details, see Haaparanta et al (2003). Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




In our sample, compared to the population of Russian firms, the majority of indus-
tries are adequately represented in terms of the share of the firms, as are the federal dis-
tricts. The fact that we surveyed medium and large enterprises explains the bias towards 
metallurgical firms regarding the distribution of industrial employment. The size distribu-
tion of our final sample is close to the population, with the median establishment having 
784 and the average over 1600 employees.  
Only 5% of the firms in the sample are relatively new, created during the 1990s. 
The majority of the firms in the sample are open joint stock companies, which is not sur-
prising as most of the formerly state-owned firms were turned into open joint stock com-
panies during the mass privatization of the early 1990s and some 80% of the sampled firms 
were privatized during 1991-1994. Lastly, similar to many previous surveys, the sample 
contains some degree of selection bias towards the better-performing firms. 
In addition to the survey data, we use municipal data from Rosstat. The exact vari-
ables used are defined below in the results section. 
 
 




In the data (Haaparanta et. al. 2003), firms provided welfare services extensively. Over 
90% reported providing or supporting at least one service in 2003. In this paper, we con-
centrate on housing provision as it has been by far the most important of the services in-
cluded in the survey (the others varying from medical services and day care to sports utili-
ties and holiday resorts).
11  
In the spring of 2003, over half of the surveyed social managers reported that their 
respective firms still owned housing or provided housing support in some other form, 
mostly through direct subsidies. It is also striking that in over half of the firms that offer 
this benefit, users are not just employees and their families. 
In our analysis of the connection between fiscal autonomy, bribes and service pro-
vision, we use the following simple question posed to the general managers of the sur-
veyed firms as the measure of whether a firm was engaged in social service provision or 
not: 
                                                 
11 In three companion papers, Juurikkala (2006), and Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006a) and (2006b), we ana-
lyze in more detail the provision of welfare services by the surveyed firms, the determinants of housing di-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Does your firm have housing? Yes or no 
 
From the probit estimations in Table 1 it may be concluded that housing within the firm in 
2003 was first and foremost determined by legacy, i.e. whether the firm had inherited 
housing from the Soviet era (from the year 1990) or not. Our main variable of interest, the 
share of own revenues in the local budget, seems to have a positive effect on whether the 
firm has housing. This effect is, however, significant only at the 10% level, or not at all, 
once we control not only for the size of the firm, measured by employment, but also for the 
size of the municipality, measured by the logarithm of the number of inhabitants. Thus, 
from the perspective of our model, housing services do not seem to be a channel through 
which tax revenues are diverted to municipalities. Our model abstracts from many ele-
ments of local decision-making. It may be, e.g., the case that the local electorate demands 
that prevailing practices be continued. Also, our model does not predict exactly what hap-
pens with every social or infrastructure service under different levels of fiscal independ-
ence. 
As to our measure of fiscal independence, the share of own revenues in the local 
budget in 1999, we use this variable as a proxy for fiscal incentives, even if it is possible 
that it does not capture the phenomenon completely. However, we feel that if a municipal-
ity has a high share of own revenues in its budget, it is highly likely that a large proportion 
of any extra income collected in the municipality would also flow to the local budget. This 
may be because the municipality has a good bargaining position towards regional and fed-
eral authorities, for example. In this case, the previously demonstrated ability to retain 
revenues more effectively would also be a signal of future actions. 
Based on more detailed analysis in a companion paper (Juurikkala 2006), we also 
include in our estimations as an explanatory variable for housing provision the question 
whether the firm received budget assistance from the public sector during the years 2000-
2002. This effect is positive and robust to different specifications. Further, having a boiler 
goes hand in hand with having housing, which is not a surprise as the local infrastructure 
was in many cases built around a large plant so that it provided heating also to the nearby 
residential buildings. What is of course interesting is that this relation has persisted until 
this decade. Lastly, supporting municipal housing is also connected with having housing 
                                                                                                                                                 
vestment timing and the compensation aspects of firm-provided benefits. Solanko (2006) analyses the deter-
minants of district heating provision by the same firms. Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




within the firm, confirming the finding from our data that service provision is done mostly 




Of the 404 firms surveyed, 306 reported having a boiler on site and 167 of them responded 
positively when asked the following question, used as our dependent variable and proxy 
for infrastructure service provision: 
 
Does your firm sell or exchange heat to outside users? Yes or no 
 
Similarly to findings in Solanko (2006), in Table 2 it can be seen that the size of the firm 
matters, as does again the inheritance factor. Having housing in 1990 mostly means that 
the firm produced also heat. Most interestingly, in contrast to housing, our measure of fis-
cal independence has now the negative effect predicted by our model, and this result is 
both significant and robust to different specifications. 
One potential explanation for this difference compared to housing services is that 
selling heat may be even profitable, irrespective of whether the firms disclose this informa-
tion or not (in our survey, only 69 of the 167 firms selling or exchanging heat outside re-
ported it as profitable), whereas keeping up housing is more likely to be a mere burden (as 
again analyzed in companion papers). Thus, firms themselves may have an incentive to go 
along with diversion if it altogether implies a lower tax burden (including bribes paid to 
authorities).  
The better the firm considered the surrounding infrastructure to be, the more likely 
it was to sell heat outside. Non-monetary help for improving local infrastructure had no 
significant relationship to heat provision. The larger the population in the municipality, the 
less likely the firm was to provide heating to users outside the firm, though this effect is 
not significant. For housing the result was again vice versa but not significant either. 
All the results presented so far are of course subject to discussion, as the specifica-
tions are simplified versions from analysis in companion papers. Our intent was to keep the 
estimations simple enough, while not losing too much information needed for the main 
purpose of this paper, which is to see whether fiscal autonomy and the propensity to bribe 
could really be connected through the channel of local service provision. 
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In the past few years more and more studies have tried to measure corruption. In this sur-
vey, we intended to utilize a benchmark way of asking these questions, namely not asking 
directly whether the firm pays something, while still asking it clearly enough for the re-
spondent to understand what we were actually after. This goal of reaching some kind of 
psychological balance between gaining knowledge of bribes and not being too offensive 
led us to the following formulation, inspired mostly by Reinikka and Svensson (2003): 
 
How much does a firm like yours typically have to pay to officials to make things work 
more smoothly? 
 
The question was asked as a percentage of the annual sales of the firm. Surprisingly many 
firms, 173 out of 404, did answer, and 69 of them gave answers above 0%, ranging from 
less than 1% to 20% of sales. For the purpose of this paper, we formulated a dummy equal 
to 1 if the firm answered something positive and 0 if the firm agreed to answer but reported 
0% "speed money". 
In line with our model's predictions, the measure of fiscal autonomy, i.e. the share 
of own revenues in the local budget, has a positive and significant effect on the probability 
that a firm reports positive bribes. This result is both significant and robust, as is seen in 
Tables 3 and 4. Having a boiler on site is positively associated with bribes. The larger the 
firm and the municipality, the less bribes seem to change hands, though these results are 
not significant. The connections of bribes with non-monetary help for local infrastructure 
building, and with the possible budgetary assistance received from the state, are as ex-
pected: positive and negative, respectively. These variables may be interpreted as forms of 
corruption themselves: officials may squeeze or accept non-monetary help from the firm in 
the same way as they demand money, and vice versa, budget assistance may be interpreted 
as a negative bribe: money moves the other way around, i.e. from the public pockets to 
private ones. 
In Table 3 we present results without, and in Table 4 results with, a Heckman cor-
rection of a response bias found in the data, namely that the more state ownership a firm 
had, the less likely it was to answer our question on bribes. The correction actually makes 
our case even stronger. We want to, however, report also some of the results without it, due 
to data limitations. Without the correction, we see that just having a boiler on site is very 
much connected with reporting positive bribes, as opposed to selling or exchanging heat Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




outside the firm, which is our main variable of interest here. With the correction, however, 
we have to date not been able to run the estimations with the boiler among the explanatory 
variables. 
Altogether the results thus far provide quite strong evidence for the role of heating 
provision in tax diversion. Both the bribe determinants and provision of heating are af-
fected by the variables of interest according to the theory presented above. 
 
3.3  Results: simultaneous estimations 
 
As bribes and service provision are determined simultaneously in our model, we utilize 
bivariate probit to answer our final question, i.e. to test whether it is service provision 
through which local fiscal incentives and bribes are connected.  
To account for the selection problem caused by survey nonresponse, we consider 
the bivariate probit as two seemingly unrelated univariate probits. The estimates of the two 
probits, the Heckman-corrected bribe equation and the heating or housing equation, should 
stay the same, but the seemingly unrelated estimation procedure corrects the standard er-
rors to account for correlation across the two equations. 
As is seen in Table 5, the simultaneous estimation results strengthen our conclu-
sions from the univariate probit estimations above. The bribe estimation results hold and 
the service results become even stronger. For heating provision, the size of the municipal-
ity is now a significant explanatory variable. The larger the population, the less likely firms 
are to provide heating to users outside the firm. The level of fiscal autonomy and the as-
sessment of the state of local infrastructure by firms also become even more significant in 
explaining whether firms provide heating in the locality.  
As to housing, the evidence from the bivariate estimation tells that it is not used for 
tax revenue diversion, and the result is stronger than from the univariate estimation. Now 
fiscal incentives have a significant, albeit weak, positive connection with housing provi-
sion. 
In addition to the results shown here in detail, we have carried out several robust-
ness checks. As our data allows us to use different proxies for service provision, we have 
tested several specifications of all of the equations. Conclusions from these estimations are 
somewhat mixed. First, all available proxies for the same services do not produce the same 
results as the survey questions chosen: for example, if one measures housing by asking a 
question on whether a firm allows outside users to benefit from company housing, the re-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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sults differ from those presented here. Second, if one chooses a completely different ser-
vice to proxy especially infrastructure, the results again change. Third, we would anticipate 
similar results if we used money spent by firms on services produced outside the firm as a 
service provision proxy, instead of the firm engaging in service production directly, but in 
practice the results are different. 
Further, both the results presented here and the outcomes of our robustness checks 
are all subject to data limitations caused by using survey data. The low number of observa-
tions for the bribe question is obviously one of our main concerns in this sense. Our results 
also hinge upon the measure of fiscal incentives we have chosen to use.  
Finally, despite these shortcomings, one result is very clear from our data: the con-
nection of fiscal incentives and bribes is positive, significant and robust. The channel 
through service provision is not quite as clear and further work is needed to better under-
stand how and why different services produce even opposite results. Our main candidate 
for an explanation is so far the possible difference in the profitability of providing the ser-




4  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we propose a model on local service provision under poorly defined property 
rights. Our model indicates that allowing for firms to produce part of the welfare or infra-
structure services required within the locality may lead to situations where reducing the 
decision-making powers of the municipality over tax revenues does not necessarily result 
in excessive regulation or other harassment of firms at the local level, which is a claim 
made in previous literature. 
The data from our survey clearly shows that firms in Russia are still active in local 
social service and infrastructure provision. We also find strong evidence for our main 
proposition that the greater the fiscal autonomy, the more likely the firms are to bribe. We 
find also that the channel through which tax revenues are diverted to local authorities is the 
provision of heating services.  
There exist naturally alternative potential explanations. First, there are strong mu-
nicipalities in Russia, which can successfully squeeze money both from the firms and the Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 




upper levels of government, and second, industrial firms are largely tied to service provi-
sion due to the Soviet legacy of more or less forced social responsibility. Or, firms provide 
services as long as the local markets for them are not developed to any modern standards. 
Still, being connected to local fiscal incentives or not, the data supports the proposi-
tion that the firms engaged in service provision are harassed less than the other firms, or in 
our case rather benefit from positive discrimination, receiving assistance from the public 
sector. In general and along many dimensions, service-providing firms have closer ties 
with the public sector than others. 
To conclude, in the analysis of a phenomenon such as corruption, poor property 
rights, ambiguous revenue and expenditure mandates, as well as local-specific institutional 
arrangements and historical legacies, may play a significant role. This should be taken into 
account, not only in a transition environment, but more generally in any empirical analysis 
of public-private interrelationships and their implications for firm performance and eco-
nomic growth. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Question: Does your firm have housing? 
 














0.209**  0.031 0.021 0.020 -0.003  -0.009 
Log municipal 
population 
- - 0.131  0.122  0.116  0.125 
Housing 1990  1.495*** 1.663*** 1.698*** 1.653*** 1.636*** 1.625*** 
The share of 
own revenues in 
mun budget 
- 0.017***  0.012  0.010  0.013*  0.014* 
Budget assistan-
ce 
- - - 0.609***  0.585***  0.517** 
Boiler  - - - - 0.506*  0.487* 
Help to mun 
housing 
- - - - - 1.320*** 
Pseudo  R2  0.1662 0.2025 0.2083 0.2321 0.2454 0.2926 
Industry  
dummies  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 








Question: Does your firm sell/ exchange heat outside the firm? 
 













0.380***  0.356*** 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.377*** … 
Log municipal 
population 
- -  -0.159  -0.154  -0.162  … 
Housing 1990  0.945***  1.494*** 1.475*** 1.564*** 1.566*** … 
The share of 
own revenues in 
mun budget 
- -0.024***  -0.018** -0.016** -0.016** … 
Assessment of 
local infra 
-  - - 0.480*  0.483*  … 
Non-m help to 
local infra 
-  - - - -0.104   
Pseudo  R2  0.1467  0.2529 0.2613 0.2734 0.2741 … 
Industry  
dummies 
yes  yes yes yes yes … 
 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level Pertti Haaparanta and Tuuli Juurikkala 
 









Question: How much does a firm like yours typically have to pay to officials to 
make things work more smoothly? Answer >0% => dummy=1 
 














-0.190 -0.168 -0.184 -0.258 -0.219 -0.274 
Log municipal 
population 
-  -0.149 -0.163 -0.174 -0.111 -0.099 
The share of 
own revenues in 
mun budget 
0.019*  0.025** 0.024** 0.030** 0.026** 0.036*** 
Housing  2003  - - 0.166  - - - 
Boiler  - - - 0.759**  - 0.942** 
Sell  heat  - - - - 0.394  - 
Non-m help to 
local infra 
- - - - - 0.740** 
Budget assistan-
ce 
- - - - - -0.590* 
Pseudo  R2  0.0757 0.0835 0.0893 0.1188 0.0952 0.1931 
Industry  
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
 
 




Question: How much does a firm like yours typically have to pay to officials to 
make things work more smoothly? Answer >0% => dummy=1 
 











-0.097 -0.074 -0.078 -0.068    
Log municipal 
population 
-  -0.070 -0.069 -0.076    
The share of 
own revenues in 
mun budget 
.013** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017***    
Housing  2003  - - -0.010  -    
Boiler  - - - -    
Sell  heat  - - - -0.047     
Non-m help to 
local infra 
- - - -    
Budget assistan-
ce 
- - - -    
Industry 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes    
 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Table 5 Biprobit: Simultaneous estimation of bribes and service provision, ownership bias corrected in the 














-0.074 -0.074   -0.074 -0.074 
Log municipal 
population 
-0.070 -0.070   -0.070 -0.070 
The share of own 
revenues in mun 
budget 
0.017*** 0.017***   0.017*** 0.017*** 
Industry dummies  yes  yes    yes yes 
Selling heat    Housing 2003    
Log employment 
2002 
0.372*** 0.369***   0.021  0.020 
Log municipal 
population 
-0.159* -0.154*   0.131  0.122 
The share of own 
revenues in mun 
budget 
-0.018*** -0.016***   0.012*  0.010 
Housing 1990  1.475*** 1.564***   1.698*** 1.653*** 
Assessment of 
local infra 
- 0.480**    - - 
Budget  assistance  - -   - 0.609*** 
Industry  dummies  yes yes   yes yes 
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Proof of proposition 2: 
 
FOC’s for (5) are (vii) and (viii): 
(vii)  ( ) 1 1 1 p p W u − = λθ  








p 1 1 1 1 =
−
= ⇒  does not depend on θ , and defines implicitly  ( ) 1 P B B =  
() ( ) 1 1 1 , p B W c B P W − = ⇒  




⇒ <0  ∴ 
 
Proof of proposition 3: 
 
From the budget constraint  () [] 1 1 1 , P B P W T W P θ θ + + =  we derive  
  [] θ θ d P W dP
dP
dB
W W B p 1 1
1









− −  
⇒ > 0    <0    <0  
θ d
dP 1 ⇒ <0 if  0 1
1
1 > − −
dP
dB
W W B p , which has to hold if we do not want to assume a  
perpetuum mobile ∴ 
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